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Abetract
This paper is devoted to the game theoretic analysis of decision situations,
in which the players have veto power over the actions undertaken by certain
other players. We give a full characterization of the dividends in these games
with a permission structure. We find that the collection of these games forms
a subspace of the vector space of all games with side payments on a specified
player set.
Two applications of these results are provided. The first one deals with the
projection of additive games on a permisaion structure. It is shown that the
Shapley value of these projected games can be interpreted as an index that
measures the power ot the agents in the permission structure. The second ap-
plication applies the derived results on games, where the organization structure
can be analysed separately from the production capacities of the participating
players.
1 Introduction
R.ecently, some authors have addressed the game theoretic analysis of (economic)
decision processes in which one imposes asymmetric constraints on the behaviour
of the decision takers. Several studies have enriched the game theoretic analysis of
the consequences of adopting this type of constraints on economic behaviour. We
mention the theory of cooperative games with arbitrary communication structures
as described in e.g. Myerson (1977 and 1980), Owen (1986), Aumann and Myerson
(1988) and Bormet al. (1990).
In this paper we introduce another type of asymmetry between players in a
cooperative game with side payments. We describe an organization in which each
player has veto power over the activities as performed by a specified collection of
players. So, all players in the game are dominating a- possibly empty - collection
of other players in the sense that they have veto power over the actions undertaken
by these players.
To illustrate this type of asymmetry between players we discuss an example.
Remind that a cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply a TU-game, is
a pair (N, v), where N- {1, ..., n} is a finite set of players and v: 2N ~ R is a
characteristic function, which assigns to every coalition E C N an achievable payoff
v(E) such that v(0) - 0.
We consider the interaction between a potential seller and two potential buyers
of some object by the use of a TU-game. The seller values the object at ten dollars,-2-
the first buyer values it at twenty dollars, and the second buyer valuea it at thirty
dollars. Following Roth (1988) this situation can be modelled as a TU-game (N, v)
with N-{1,2,3} and v givcn by v(0) - 0, v(I) - 10, v(2) - v(3) - 0, v(12) - 20,
v(13) - 30, v(23) - 0, and v(N) - 30. Applying the Shapley value, developed in
Shapley (1953), as the appropriate standard in dividing these potential payoffa we
derive that ~p~(v) - 213, ~pz(v) - 13, and ~p3(v) - 63.
Next we introduce the additional information that the seller, player 1, only has
the right to use the object, but that the property righta are in the hands of the first
buyer, player 2. This implies that the seller has to get permission from the first buyer
with respect to the sale of the object.' Instead of the game (N, v) as described above,
we have to describe the new situation with the use of a modified game (N, w), where
w is given by w(0) - w(1) - w(2) - w(3) - 0, w(12) - 20, w(13) - w(23) - 0,
and w(N) - 30. In this modification we take account of the fact that player 2 has to
be member of any payoff generating coalition. Again applying the Shapley value as
the appropriate standard in dividing the payoffs gives us ~pl(w) - ~pa(w) - 133 and
~s(w) - 33.
The example above describes the consequences of the separation between prop-
erty rights and user rights. It is out purpose to separate the (potential) individual
abilities as described by the game from the behaviouristic rules or the organization
structure such as the separation of property rights from user rights. From the exam-
ple we conclude that constraints imposed by an organization structure may influence
payoffs considerably. This is the topic of this paper as well as the work by van den
Brink and Gilles (1991) and Gilles and Owen (1991).
We refer to the interpretation of the dominance structure as considered in the exam-
ple, in wliich a player lias to get permission Crom al! her superiors to pursue a certain
goal, as the Conjunctive approach.t By assumption we exclude the possibility that
players mutually have veto power over their actions.
The main part of this paper is devoted to the analysis of cooperative games
with side payments in which the players are organized in a permission structure
as described above. In our analysis we subsequently introduce such games with
'In other words, this means that player 2 can vefo the sale of the object.
1Gilles and Owen (1991) analyse the consequences of another interpretation of the dominance
structure within a óierarchical organization. In thie Disjunctivc approacA it is assumed that every
player has to get permission from at least one of het superioro.-3-
permission structure and then apply the Conjunctive approach to give a description
of the possibilities of the players in such a situation. We then modify the game
accordingly. Our main result statea that the collection of theae modified TU-gamea is
generated by a apecific class of unanimity games, namely those on coalitiona, which
contain precisely all the players who have to give their permission to the actions of its
members. These coalitions are called autonomous in the permission structure. With
the use of this result we can give a description of the dividends of all coalitions in
such games with permission structure.
Finally we discuss two applications of games with permission structure. The
first application deals with additive games restricted to a permission structure. The
Shapley value of such a restricted game can be interpreted as an index describing the
(positional or social) power of the players in the permission structure. Our analysis
shows that this provides an alternative for the power indices as developed by van den
Brink and Gilles (1990). The power indices as described in that paper are based on
a heuristic approach to social power in hierarchies, while the power indices resulting
from restrictions of additive games to permission structures are essentially based on
a game theoretic approach to social power.
The second application deals with an economic production situation, in which
the productive players form the lowest level in an organization as described by a
hierarchical permission structure. The managers in the higher levels are assumed to
be unproductive, but are necessary for the organization of these productive players
in productive units. We show that the managers can claim at least the average value
of the productive players, whom they dominate.
An axiomatic approach to the Shapley value for games with permission struc-
ture is given by van den Brink and Gilles (1991).
2 Games with permission structures
This section is devoted to an exposition and analysis of permission structures on sets
of players. Before we are able to introduce the main instrument in the description and
analysis of these permission structures, we have to make some notational conventions.
Firstly we denote by N:- { 1, 2, 3, ...} the set of all natural numbers. Similarly we
denote by R the set of all real numbers. If X is some finite set, then we denote by
~X its cardinality. By GN we denote the collection of all characteristic functions v-4-
on the finite player set N, representing a TU-game (N, v). It is obvious that ~N is a
(2" - 1)-dimensional real vector space, where n-~N.
A formal description of a domination structure on an arbitrary collection of
players N is developed in the next definition.
Definition 2.1 A permission structure on a ftnite playerset N is a mapping
S: N-~ 2N, which is asymmetric, i.e., for every pairi,j E N
j E S(i) èmplies that i~ S(j).
The collection of all permission structures on N is denoted as SN.
We remark that asymmetry of the permission structure S implies that it also satisfies
irreflexity, i.e., for every player i E N it holds that i~ S(i). The players j E S(i) are
called the sucr.essors of i. In our setting a player i E N is assumed to dominate his
successors j E S(i), in which the notion oí "domination" will formally be specified in
the next section.
For every permission stcucture S E SN we can define a binary relation Rs C
N x N given by
Rs :- {(i, j) ~ i E N and j E S(i)}.
It is clear that Rs is an asymmetric and irreflexive relation on N and describes the
dominance relations induced by the permission structure S on N.
Let S E SN be a permission structure and Rs the belonging binary relation.
Now we denote by tr(Rs) the transitive closure of Rs.t We introduce the mapping
S: N -~ 2N by
S(i) :- {j E N ~(i,j) E tr(Rs)},
assigning to every player i E N her suóordinates. Similarly we denote by
S-'(i) :- {j E N ~(j,i) E tr(Rs)}
the collection of the superiors of player i E N in the permission etructure R on N.
For every coalition E C N we define S(E) :- U;EES(i). Analogously for every
coalition F, C N we define the collections S(E), and S''(E).
tThe traneitive doeure tr(R) ofaome binary relation R C N x N is given by (i,j) E tr(R) if and
only if there exiate a sequence {h~,...,h,,,} C N with hl - i, (ht,hktl) E R for 1 G k G m- 1,
and h,,, - j.-5-
With the use of the concept of a permission structure as introduced above we
define a game with permission structure.
Definition 2.2 A game with permission atructure is a triple (N, v, S), where
N is a finite set of playr.rs, v E ~!N is a coopemtive game with side payments on N,
and S E SN is a permission structure on N.
It is clear that the collection of all games with permission structure on a playeraet N
is precisely the collection CI" x SN.
3 The Conjunctive approach
If (N, v, S) is a game with permission structure, then we can interpret the situatíon
described as followa. Essentially, we can think ofv E~N as representing the economic
possibilities open to every coalition in N. Thus v(E) represents the amount of utility,
which coalition E C N could normally obtain were it not for the permission structure
as imposed on the game. In the sequel we explicitly assume that the members of E
cannot act without permission from all their predecessors. More precisely, if any
i E E belongs to S(N ` E), then she cannot act without permission of at least one
player, who is not in E, and is therefore "lost~ or "unproductiveM to the coalitiong
In this case coalition E can only count on the cooperation of those i E E, who do not
require outside permission for their acts. We refer to the interpretation as described
above as the Conjunctive approach to games with permission structure. We remark
that other interpretations are also possible, as is shown in Gilles and Owen (1991).
The reasoníng as followed above leads to the introduction ofa class of coalitions
that are able to act without permission from players outside that coalition.
Definition 3.1 Let S E SN be a permission structure on N. The coalition E C N
is autonomous in S if
E n S(N `E) - 0.
The collection of alI autonomous coalitions in the permission structure S is denoted
6y ~s.
Sln the sale o[ an object ae deacribed in the introduction thia is the case with player 1. He has
to get permiasion from the property righta owner, player 2, before he is able to sell or execute the
user righta.-6-
According the ConjuncLive approach the autonomous coalitions are essentially the
only payoff generating coalitions within a game with permission structure. The prooí
of the following lemma is obvious.
I.emma 3.2 Let S E SN be a permission structure on N and let E C N 6e some
coalition. Then E is autonomous ijand only if S''(E) C E.
Lemma 3.2 shows explicitly that indeed all superiors of the players in an autonomous
coalition are also member of that coalition. With reapect to the collection 4's of all
autonomous coalitions we can say the following.
Proposition 3.3 Let S E SN 6e a permission structure on N. Then the collection
4's of autonomous coalitions satisfies the following properties:
(i) B E 4's-
(ii) N E 4's.
(iii) For all E, F E 4's it holds that E U F E 4is and E fl F E 4's.
PROOF
By Lemma 3.2 E E 4's means that S-'(i) C E for every i E E. It follows that
OE~s(asnoiEO)andNE4's(asS-'(i)CNforalliEN).
If E, F E 4's and i E E U F, then either i E E or i E F. If i E E, then S-'(i) C E C
E U F. Similarly, this holds for i E F, and hence E U F E~s.
If E, F E 4's and i E E fl F, then i E E as well as i E F. Thus, S-'(i) C E as well
as S-1(i) C F, and so S-1(i) C E fl F. Thus, E fl F E 4's.
Q.E.D.
From the properties as mentioned in Proposition 3.3 it immediately follows that
for any coalition E C N there exiats a largest autonomous subset and a smallest
autonomous superset. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 3.4 Let S E SN and let E C N. The sovereign part of E in S is the
set
o(E) :- U{F' ~ F' C E, F E ~s}.
The authorizing set of E in S is given by-~-
a(E) :- n{F ~ E C F, F E 4's}.
In the framework of the Conjunctive approach it is clear that a coalition E C N can
maximally obtain the payoff generated by its sovereign part o(E). On the other hand
the authorizing set a(E) of E is precisely the smallest coalition, which contains all
members of E as well as their superiors. Hence, the authorizing set is the smalleat
coalition containing E, which can act autonomously.
Lemma 3.5 Let S E SN and E C N. Then the following properties hold:
(a) v(E) - E `S(N `E).
(b) a(E) - E U S''(E).
The proof of the lemma is left to the reader.
Example 3.8 Consider the playcr set N- {I, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and the permission atruc-
ture S: N ~ 2N given by
S(1) - {2,3,4}, S(2) - {4}, S(3) - {5}, S(4) - {6}, S(5) - 0, S(6) - 0.
This structure can be represented by the following directed graph.
Take E- {1, 4,6}, then S(N ` E) -{4, 5}. Clearly, since E fl S(N `E) -{4} ~ 0,
the coalition E is not autonomous. As S(N `E) -{4, 5, 6}, the sovereign part of E
is given by Q(E) - E`S(N ` E) -{1}. Furthermore, the authorizing set of E is
just a(E) - {1,2,4,6}.
To complete the introductory analysis of the concepts of the sovereign part and the
authorizing set of a coalition we prove the following properties.
Proposition 3.7 Let E, F C N be two coalitions. Then-8-
(i) a(E) U o(F) C o(E U F).
(ii) o(E) n v(F) - o(E n F).
(iii) a(E) U a(F) - a(E U F).
(iv) a(E n F) c a(E) n a(F).
PROOF
From the definition we derive that for every E C N
v(E) -{i E E ~ S-~(i) C E}.
Using this equality we prove the assertions of the proposition.
(i) Let i E v(E) U o(F). Then S-~(i) C E or S'1(i) C F. Hence, S'1(i) C
(E U F) and the assertion follows by definition.
(ii) Clearly i E o(E n F) iff S'~(i) E E n F. This is equivalent to the atatement
that i E a(E) as well as á E v(F).
(iii) The assertion easily follows from the following equation:
a(E U F) - U S'1(i) U E U F
iEEuF
- U S-1(i)U U S'3(7)UEUF
iEE jEF
- a(E) U a(F).
(iv) For i E a(En F) it either holds that i E E n F or there is some j E E n F
such that j E S(i).
Ii i E E n F, then surely i E a(E) as well as i E a(F), i.e., i E a(E) n a(F).
If there is some j E En F with j E S(i), then by the fact that j E E as well
as j E F it is evident that i E a(E) as well as i E a(F).
Q.E.D.-9-
4 Conjunctive restrictions
In the definition of a game with permission structure (N, v, S) we introduced the po-
tential payoffs, represented by the game v E GN, independently from the permission
structure S E SN. Based on the Conjunctive approach, in this section we transform
a game with permission structure into a single TU-game, which describes all possi-
bilities open to the players in tl~e permission structure S, given their potentials as
described by the game v. The resulting TU-game is called the Conjunctive restriction
of v on permission structure S.
For that purpose we introduce for an arbitrary permission structure S E S"'
the following collection of TU-games:
~(N, S) :- {v E GN ~ v(E) - v(o(E)), for all E C N}.
The Conjunctive restriction of a game v on a permission structure S is now simply
defined as the projection of v on the set C(N, S) in the real vector space GN:
Definition 4.1 Let v E~N and lel S E SN. The game w E ~(N, S) is the Con-
junctive restriction of v on S iJ it satisfies the property that Jor every coalition
ECN
w(E) - v (o(E)) .
Definition 4.1 introduces a mapping 1ZS: ~N ~ Q(N, S), which assigns to every game
v E~N its (Conjunctive) restriction 1ZS(v) - w E r~(N, S). It is evident that RS is a
linear mapping on GN. To study its properties we consider two alternative bases for
thc ('l" - 1)-dimimsiona) rcal vector spacc~ ~N.
The standard basis of CN is given by the games {zE ~ E C N, E~ 0} defined
by
1 if E-F
zE(F) - 0 if E~ F
It is easy to see that in terms of the standard basis the game v E t~N can be expressed
d5
v - ~ v(E) . zE. (1)
ECN
E;0-lo-
'I'he unanimily basis of ~i~`' consists of the games {uF ~ E C N, F, ~ 0} given by
( 1 if F,CF
0 otherwise ue:~(F') - S`
Following Harsanyi (1959) the game v E GN can be expressed as
v - ~ ~„(E) ' uE, (2)
scx
E~~
where the quantity 0„(E) is referred to as the dividend of coalition E in game v. For
every E C N this dividend is given by
0~(E) ,- ~ (- 1)~E-t~FV(F). (3)
FCE
We remark that for every coalition E C N its worth v(E) and its dividend 0„(E)
are related by both (3) and the equivalent system
v(E) - ~ 0„(F).
FCE
To analyze the projection mapping RS properly, we study its behaviour on the col-
lection of all unanimity games uE, where E C N, E~~.
Theorem 4.2 Let E C N, E~ 0, be any coalition. Then
Rs(uE) - ua~E~.
PROOF
Let F- cz(E) and w- RS(uE). By Lemma 3.5 F is an autonomous coalition, i.e.,
o(F) - F. Furthermore, let G C N be any (non-empty) coalition.
First we look at the case that F C G. Then E C F- o(F) C o(G), and so
w(C) - uE (v(G)) - 1.
Next suppose that F is not a subset of G, i.e., F`G ~ 0. Then there exists a player
j E F with j~ G. Since j E F we have either that j E E or j E S-~(E).
If j E E, then E`G ~ 0 and thus E`a(G) ~ 0.
If j E S-'(E), then there is some player i E E with i E S(j). As j ~ G, this
mcans that i E S(N `G), and so i ~ o(C). Again we arrive at the conclusion that
E `o(G) ~ 0.
In either case we may conclude that-11-
w(G) - uE (o(G)) - 0.
This implies that
t~ (~,~ - r 1 if a(E) C G
Sl 0 oLhcrwisc
and so w - ua(E).
Q.E.D.
With the iise of the unanimity basis of C~N and the belonging dividends we now can
express the linear mapping Rs.
Corollary 4.3 Lel v E GN 6e any game. Then
~s(v) - ~ ~ 0~(E) . uF.
FEms ECN
a(E)-F
This gives the desired expression for the Conjunctive restriction belonging to an
arbitrary game with permission structure. In the next section this expression is used
frequently to analyze games with a permission structure.
The second main result adresses the properties of the mapping Rs as a projection
mapping in the space of all TU-games C~N.
Theorem 4.4 The linear mapping Rs is a projection mapping of rank A on GN,
where A-~~s - 1 is the number of non-empty autonomous subsets in S. Its kernel
is genemted by the games {zE ~ E~ 4is}. Its image is genernted by the unanimity
games {uE ~ E E ~s}.
PROOF
Suppose that the coalition E C N is not autonomous. Let zE be the standard basis
game belonging to E and let w-?Zs(zE) be the restriction of zE on S.
Now there is no coalition F such that E- a(F). Thus for any coalition F C N
w(F) - zE(o(F)) - 0.-12-
We may conclude that w is the null game and so zE E Kernel (Rs).
Now suppose that E C N, E~ 0, is an autonomous coalition. By Theorem 4.2 it
holds that Rs(uE) - utr1El. With E- a(E) it immediately follows that 7Zs(uE) -
uE, and hence that uE E Image (7Zs).
Now the 2" - 1 - A games zE, E not autonomous, all belong to the kernel of 7Zs.
Since these games are all linearly independent, the dimension of the kernel of Rs
must be at least 2" - 1- A.
On the other hand, the A games uE, with E autonomous, all belong to the image of
?Ls. These are also all linearly independe,nt, and so the dimension of the image of
1Zs is at least A.
But the sum of these dimensions must be exactly 2" - 1. Thus
dim (Kernel (1Zs)) - 2" - I- A, and
dim(Image(1Zs)) - A.
The given sets of games clearly form bases for the kernel respectively the image of
the linear mapping 1ZS.




Hence, from Theorem 4.2 it immediately follows that Rs(v) - v.
Q.E.D.
Based on the theorems as derived above and the properties as given in Proposition 3.7
we are able to prove some additional properties of the mapping Rs: CJN -~ CJ(N, S).
Before stating these properties we recall some well known game theoretic concepts.
Definition 4.5 Let v E GN 6e a TU-game.
(a) v is monotone if for a!l coalitions E, F C N with E C F it holds that
v(E) C v(F).
(b) v is auperadditive if for all coalitions E, F C N with Efl F- 0 it holds that-13-
v(E U F) ~ v(E) f v(F).
(c) v is convex if for all coalitions E, F C N it holds that
v(E u F) f v(E n F) ~ v(E) f v(F).
(d) v is balanced if the Core of ihat game is not empty, i.e., there exists a
function x: N -~ R such that for every coalition E C N: x(E) :- ~;EE x; ~
v(E) and x(N) - v(N).
The next result states that most of the above properties are invariant with respect
to taking the conjunctive restriction of a game on a permission structure.
Theorem 4.6 Let S E SN be any permission structure.
(~) !f v E GN is monotone, then its Conjunctive restriction Rs(v) is monotone
also. Moreover, if v is balanced, then RS(v) is balanced also.
(ii) Fór every superadditive game v E~N its Conjunct4ve restriction Rs(v) is
superadditive also.
(iii) !f v E ~N is cotavex, then its Conjunctive restriction Rs(v) is convex also.
(iv) !f S is such that there exists a player io E N with S(io) - N ` {áo}, then the
Conjunctive restriction RS(v) of any monotone game v E ~N is superadditive
and óalanced.
PROOF
Take an arbitrary game v E CjN and let w :- RS(v) be its Conjunctive restriction.
(i) Suppose v is monotone. Take E C F and let G:- F`E. Then
w(F) - v(o(F)) - v(a(E U G)) ? v(o(E) U o(G)) 1 v(o(E)) - w(E).
Suppose that v is balanccd as well as monotone and 1ct x be a Core impu-
tatiou, i.c., x(N) - v(N) and for cvcry E C N: x(Is) 1 v(F,'). Then by
monotonicity for every E C N it holds that v(E) ~ v(o(E)) - w(E), and
hence x(E) ~ v(E) ~ w(E). Thus, x is a Core imputation of w also.-14-
(ii) Suppose v is superadditive. Take E, F C N such that E fl F- 0. Then
v(o(E U F)) 1 v(o(E) U o(F)) ~ v(a(E)) f v(a(F)).
(iii) Suppose v is convex. Without loss of generality we may assume that v(E) ~ 0
for all coalil.ions !? C N. Now takc !', F' C N. Thcn
w(E U F) - v(a(E U F)) - v(o(E) U a(F) U H),
where H- o(E U F) `(a(E) U v(F)). Since H fl o(E) - H fl o(F) - 0 it
follows by convexity of v that
v(v(E U F)) ~ v(o(E) U o(F)) f v(H) ~ v(v(E) U v(F)).
Hence, with (ii) of Proposition 3.7,
w(E U F) f w(E fl F) - v(o(E U F)) f v(o(E fl F))
1 v(o(E) U a(F)) -E v(o(E) fl v(F))
1 v(o(E)) ~ v(o(F)) - w(E) t w(F).
(iv) Suppose that v is monotone. Since for every coalitíon E C N it holds that
v(N) ) v(E) as well as v(N) - w(N) ~ w(E) and for every coalition
F C N`{io} w(F) - 0 it follows immediately that the imputation x with
x;o - v(N) and x~ - 0, j~ io is in the Core of w.
To show superadditivity take E, F C N with E fl F- 0. From the property
of S it is clear that either o(E) -~ or o(F) - 0 or o(E) - o(F) - 0. Thus,
we only have to establish that in case o(E) ~ ~ and v(F) - 0 it holds that
w(E U F) - v(o(E U F)) ~
1 v(a(E)) - v(o(E)) ~ v(v(F)) - w(E) t w(F).
Q.E.D.- ls-
5 Some applications
This section is devoted to two applications of our analysis of games with a permis-
sion structure. The first application discusses the collection of additive games and
their restrictions to an acyclic permission structure. In this example we alao derive
an expression for the Shapley value of such a restriction. In this case the Shapley
value gives a representation of the (weighted) hierarchical power of a player in the
permission structure of the game. In the second application we discuss a specified
class of games on a given hierarchicalpermission structure S E SN, namely those of
which the payoff generating players are in the lowest echelon or level in the hierarchy.
5.1 Additive games with permission structure
The valuation of a position in a permission structure depends, of course, on the
abilities of the individual membcrs, which are above and below that poaition. These
abilities are represented by the original, unrestricted game v E~N. By taking certain
LLstandard" games for v, we can obtain insights into the "value" of a position in the
structure as described by S E SN. This analysis has to be performed with respect to
the Conjunctive restriction R,S(v) of the original game v.
In this subsection we restrict ourselves to the analysis of acyclic permission
structures with the use of additive games. A permission S E SN is acyclic if for every
player i E N it holds that i~ S(i). Let a:- (a~, ..., a„) E R~~ be a strictly positive
vector of weights. Next we introduce the game va E rjN as the additive game with
weight vector a given by
va(E) :- ~ a;, E C N.
~EE
Thus, it is assumed that the (original) individual abilities of player i E N are repre-
sented by the weight a; 1 0. Since the player i E N has to give permission to her
subordinates j E S(i), she can evidently claim a part of the payoff generated by these
subordinates. This is exactly what is described by the restricted game RS(va). By an-
alyzing these restricted games, we analyze the power structure within the permission
structure.
lt ls OI)VIOnY that for cvcry coalition I: C N it holds that-16-
- r~; if E-{i} for some i E N
o~a(E)
Sl 0 otherwise
Let wa :- RS(va). Then by Corollary 4.3 we can derive that for every coalition
ECN, E~O,
~wa(E) - ~ ~~. (4)
o({~)-E
By definition of the authorizing set of a coalition and the acyclicity of S it is obvious
that for all players i, j E N with i~ j it is not possible that i E S(j) as well as





The next step in our analysis is to give a complete description of the Shapley value
of wa. A well known formula for the Shapley value, applied to the game w~ is given
by
~P~(wa) - ~ Ow.(E) i E N.
ECN ~~
~EE
flence, substituting (4) in (5) yields for every player i E N
w~ - ~i - ~~ } ~i ~v;( ) ~~ p(j) f 1 a(i) t 1 ;E~~;, a(j) t 1'
iEa({j})
where Q(j) :- ~S-~(j) for every j E N.
(5)
This expression of the Shapley value of the restriction of the additive game
va is clearly an index that measures the hierarchica.l power of players in the (acyclic)
permission structure S. Taking the weights of the players into account this index
only depends upon the organization structure as represented by S. The weight of
some player i E N is equally spread over herself and her superiors.
Example 5.1 Consider the permission structure as given in Example 3.6. Clearly it
is acyclic. We immediately see that ~3(1) - 0, ~i(2) - 1, (j 3(3) - 1, ~i(4) - 2, Fl(5) - 2,
and ~3(6) - 3. Now we assign Lo every player the unit weight, i.e., a-(1, ..., 1) E
R}. The Shapley value of the Conjunctive restriction of the additive game va is given
by17
~(Rs(va)) - 12
~(35,13, 10, 7, 4, 3).
Comparing this power index with the Shapley value of the original additive game va,
which is given by ip(va) -(1,..., 1) E Rt, we conclude that a substantial shift in
power has been resulting from the various positions of the players in the permission
structure S. The leader 1 E N clearly has gained a much higher payoff because of
his leadership.
5.2 Games with unproductive superiors
[n this subsection we consider hierarchicalpermission structures and apply this con-
cept to analyzeorganizations in which the "productive" playcrs are in the lowest level
in the hierarchy.
We define a permission structure S E SN to be hierarchicalif it is acyclic and
for every pair i, j E N there exists a player h E N such that
{i, j} C [S(h) u {h}].
lu van dcu 13rink au~l Cilli~s (1990) it is ahuwu that thcre exists a partition 1.~,... , I„y
of N such that
Li -{i E N ~ S(i) - 0}, and
Lk-{iEN`IJL,~S(á)CULp 1
, 2ckGM.
l y-1 y-1 -
Moreover, it can be shown that L,y consists of a singleton only. The sets Lk are called
the echelons or levels of the hierarchical permission structure S. Refering to Swamy
and Thulasiraman (1981) we note that the belonging binary relation Rs describes an
acyclic quasi-strongly connected directed graph in case S is hierarchical.
Let E C N be some coalition. Then we indicate by
p(E) :- {i E E ~ S(i) n E- 0}
the collection of pending players in E. With the definition of echelons in the per-
mission structure S we derive that p(N) - Ll. With the use of the notion of
pending players as defined above we can derive an alternative characteri~ation of
an autonomous coalition.-IB-
Lemma 5.2 Let E C N and let F C E. Then E- a(F) if and only if p(E) C F
and E - a(p(E)).
PROOF
Jlf
Since p(E) C F it is clear that E- a(p(E)) C o(F) C ~(E) - a(p(E)) - E.
Only if
Suppose by contradiction that there is a player i E p(E) such that i~ F. By
definition S(i) fl E- 0. But E- a(F) implies that there exists a player j E F C E
with i E S-~(j), i.e., j E S(i). This is in contradiction with the supposition. Thus
we conclude that p(E) C F and furthermore E- a(E) - a(p(E)).
Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.3 E C N is an autonomous coalition if and only if E-~(p(E)).
With these notions and results we can restate the expressions for the dividends of
the Conjunctive restriction of a game in terms of the dividends of the original game
as derived in Section 4. Let v E riN and Ict w- RS(v). Then we derive that for all
E C N with E- a(p(E)):
Ow(E) - ~ 0~(F)-
FCN
p(E)CF
This again can be rewritten as
Ow(E) - ~ ~~(F U p(E)).
FC S-~(p(E))
Now we turn to the description of a situation with unproductive superiors.
Let P- { 1, ..., p} and Q-{p t 1, . .., p f q}. Define N:- P U Q. ( Hence, it
holds that n- p~- q.) Now we take a hierarchical permission structure S E SN such
that
Q - p(N) (- L~). (6)
('roin (G) iL follows that for every i E Q: .S(i) -(d. Ikeuce, Lhe collection Q is the low~~st
echelon in the hierarchy as described by the permission structure S. 1t is our purpose
to describe a situation in which the players in Q are (potentially) "productive", while
the players in P are (potentially) "unproductiver. However, from their positions in-19-
the hierarchy the unproductive players or managers in P can claim certain portions
of the payoffs generated by the productive players or workers in Q.
We construct such a game with permission structure as follows. Let u E GQ
be any game on the player set Q. Now we define the game v E GN by
v(B) :- u(E n Q), E c N.
It is clear that (N, v, S) as constructed above indeed describes a situation with man-
agers i E P and workers i E Q. The allocation of payoffs in this particular situation
can be analyzed with the use of the Shapley value of the Conjunctive restriction of v
on S.
Thus, we define w - 7ZS(v) as the relevant description of the productive
situation. Now by the results as proved in Section 4 we derive that
Ow(E) - r ~„(E n Q) if E- a(E n Q)
Sl 0 otherwise
We note that the requirement that E- a(E n Q) is equivalent to the condition
that E- a(p(E)) and p(E) C Q. With use of this formulation we can analyze the
positions of the players in the production game w by means of the Shapley value.
For the productive workers in (N, v, S) we can deduce the following. Let i E Q,
then
~Gi(w) - ~ O~ w ((E) - ~ ~~ J.u(F)
ECN YiE FCp Yr~(Fi
).
iEE iEF
Evidently, for every player i E F C Q it holds
~F ~- ~i(i). Hence,
~F' ~ ~F G q
~a(F) - ~F-~ Q(i) - 4 t Q(i)
This leads to the conclusion that for every i E Q
that ~a(F) ~ ~F t ~S-'(i) -
~~(w) C 9 f Q(i)
`P~(u)
We remark that the bound is exact if and only if i is the unique productive player in
the game w, i.e., Q-{i}.
We give a similar analysis for the "unproductive~ managers in the collection
P. For every i E P define Q(i) :- {F C Q ~ F fl S(i) ~ 0}. Then the expected
payoff, represented by the Shapley value, is for every i E P given by-20-
0~(F)
~P~(ui) - ~ ~n(r,).
FEQ(Q
Therefore for i E P - by defining q; :- ~p(S(i)), where p(S(i)) - Qf1S(i) - it follows
that
1
~p;(w) 1 max cpi(w) ~-~ ~ cpi(w).
iEn(s(~)) 9t iEV(s(71
Example 5.4 Again take the permission structure as described in Example 3.6. It
clearly is hierarchical with echelons L~ -{5, 6}, LZ -{3, 4}, L3 -{2}, and L~ -{1 }.
Take P:- N`Ll -{1,2,3,4} and Q :- Lr -{5,6}. Now let the game u E~Q be
given by
u(0) - 0 ;
u({5}) - u({6}) - 1 ;
u(Q) - 5.
Evidently it holds that the dividends are given by
~„({5}) - ~„({6}) - 1 ;
0,.(Q) - 3.
As before define the garne v E GN as v(E) :- u(E fl Q), for every E C N. Applying
the formulas as derived above we can compute that
~p(w) - 12 . ( 13,9, 10,9,10,9),
where w:- RS(v). This shows that the upper bound as given above for players in
Q indeed gives a good indication for the payoff that is actually reached under the
Conjunctive approach to the description of a production organization. Moreover, it
shows that the lower bound for certain players in P can be exact as is the case for
players 2 and 3.-21-
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